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LET THE PROCESS OF DEREGULATION
CONTINUE*
BY WESLEY G. KALDAHL**
U NDER DEREGULATION, events in the airline indus-
try have moved so rapidly that we have tended to lose
track of major milestones - and the places events occupy
in time. It therefore comes as somewhat of a surprise to
note that deregulation is now six years old. After all,
wasn't it only yesterday that airline representatives were
camped outside CAB headquarters, waiting to apply for
dormant route authority?
Whether it was yesterday or not, one thing is clear: the
Deregulation Act of 1978' ushered in for the nation's air-
lines a revolution as profound and far-reaching as the
revolution upon which our nation was founded. After
Congress and the President acted in 1978, the airline
business was changed forever. The question on this sixth
anniversary, however, is whether all of the upheaval and
dramatic change that have characterized the industry's ad-
justment to deregulation have been good or bad, both for
the industry and for the public it serves?
In my view the jury is still out on that question. But the
record should also show that there is mounting evidence
to support the view that deregulation has done more
harm than good. I may make this statement with a touch
of irony because American Airlines on the whole has ad-
*This article is taken from a speech prepared by Mr. Kaldahl in early 1984.
** Senior Vice President - Airline Planning; American Airlines, Inc.
, Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (1978)
(amending Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. § § 1301-1552 (1982)).
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justed well to the new environment. I also strongly believe
that the industry is now down the road of change much
too far to turn back. Nevertheless, one cannot deny the
excruciating difficulties that have beset the industry -
and most especially the large, established carriers like
American - in this tough new age.
During the initial phases of debate on deregulation,
American was among the staunchest opponents of dereg-
ulation. At that time, the question was rather clear-cut:
Should the existing regulatory system be retained or
should it be discarded in favor of a new, deregulated order?
In that context, American argued for keeping the regul-
tory system. Without question, there were elements of
self-interest, but the overriding concern was for the air
transport system itself (of which American was a key com-
ponent). The regulatory system, although not without
flaws, had served the industry and the public extremely
well for forty years. American maintained that any re-
quirement to stimulate price and route competition could
be accomplished within that structure. American pointed
out that deregulation, with its uncertainty and instability,
could not avoid producing a detrimental effect on the air-
line system, including airports and airport operators.
Over time, however, the fundamental question before
the nation changed. No longer was it a choice between
regulation and deregulation, but only a question of what
form deregulation should take. American then came out
forcefully for total and immediate deregulation as the
preferable alternative to the piecemeal proposals that
would leave the industry half free and half restrained. Ul-
timately, in what could only be termed a supreme philo-
sophical contradiction, the piecemeal approach prevailed,
and the industry found itself partially deregulated.
How the industry has fared since that fateful day in Oc-
tober of 1978 best illustrates the onerous effects of the
deregulatory scheme finally enacted. Financially, of
course, the industry is presently in serious trouble. Sup-
porters of deregulation, however, quickly point to the in-
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dustry's outstanding profit performance in 1978. Indeed,
1978 was an exceptional year for the airlines. As a group,
the majors alone reported operating earnings of almost
$1.2 billion, and some carriers, including Amercan, set in-
dividual profit records.
In no way, however, can these results be attributed to
the positive effects of deregulation. The Airline Deregu-
lation Act was not passed until late October of 1978. Sev-
eral months elapsed before the new regulatory order
began to have a competitive impact, and consequently to
have an effect on the airlines' financial results. In truth,
1979 was the industry's first full year of deregulation. By
the end of that year, the industry was awash in the red ink
that has since been flowing freely among most of the
airlines.
The numbers speak for themselves. Between 1979 and
1982, the major airlines had combined operating losses of
over $1.2 billion. Losses have continued for some carri-
ers, even in a supposed recovery. Although some individ-
ual carriers have shown improvement, the majors as a
whole had net losses of more than $181 million in 1983
with rough financial weather continuing into 1984. Even
Delta, one of the industry's traditional profit leaders, suf-
fered financially in the 1983 fiscal year.2
Significantly, the industry is losing money and contin-
ues to struggle financially in spite of several developments
which, on the surface, should be improving airline balance
sheets. For example, fuel prices have declined, saving the
industry about $100 million a year with each one cent
drop in the price per gallon. Various wage and work-rule
concessions by labor unions are saving some carriers
many millions of dollars each year. Agreements by major
lending institutions are assisting certain struggling air-
lines either by restructuring their debt or by forgiving
portions of their debt entirely. Furthermore, some air-
2 See 1984 MOODY'S TRANSPORTATION MANUAL 1427-28.
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lines are reducing overall costs by contributing less to em-
ployee pension funds.
Each of these developments has produced tens of mil-
lions of dollars in savings for the struggling carriers. Nev-
ertheless, these savings have not been enough to prevent
the massive losses that have been making business page
headlines for more than three years. Something in the
airline environment, then, must be standing in the way of
renewed profitability. Is the industry suffering from some
chronic financial deficiency? Or is the industry simply suf-
fering from the effects of a lingering and pronounced re-
cession? There can be no denying that the recession has
hurt; yet to suggest that the recession is our sole eco-
nomic problem and that deregulation has been entirely
beneficial is to deny the history of the last six years. De-
regulation has had and continues to have a profound
complicating effect on the financial health, not only of the
airline business, but also of aircraft manufacturing and
other allied industries. The answer may be stated in two
words: excessive competition.
When Congress enacted deregulation, it fully expected
that the new law would intensify competition. What Con-
gress did not anticipate, however, is the ruinous degree to
which this competition has developed. Amid the oversim-
plifications that sometimes prevail when a legislative body
considers an issue as complex as airline operations, Con-
gress tended to equate increased competition with a set of
perceived social benefits, most notably lower air fares and
more service. Congress overlooked the less than obvious
risks of deregulation.
More airline players, for example, mean less control
over the critical economic factors that play such key roles
in day-to-day business decisions and "long-range plan-
ning." More players mean greater cost disparity among
individual airlines, placing some carriers at a serious com-
petitive disadvantage not necessarily of their own making.
More players mean excessive capacity in certain key mar-
kets, encouraging unsound pricing practices and even
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sparking some disastrous fare wars. And, conversely,
more players mean a serious reduction in service in many
less glamorous markets. More players mean a waste of
precious jet fuel as more carriers fly more empty seats
over more routes. As history has unfolded, these risks
have become some of the harsh economic realities of de-
regulation, creating a business climate not conducive to
making money. Such has been the crux of the industry's
problems for the past six years.
At the same time, deregulation has not delivered to the
public all of the benefits that were suggested would flow
almost automatically. The lower fares that were to be-
come a natural consequence of increased competition
provide a good illustration. In actuality, fares have fallen
in a few markets, though not in the smaller communities.
Although competiton under deregulation has indeed in-
tensified, that competition has tended to be highly con-
centrated around a handful of major cities. It is on these
routes and in these cities where most of the fare cutting
has been initiated. In those markets where competition
has not developed or has declined, fares have remained at
much higher levels and, in some cases, are higher than
they might have been without deregulation.
Perhaps the most vivid example of concentration in
competition is the New York-Los Angeles and New York-
San Francisco markets. Under the old system, each route
was aggressively and adequately served by three nonstop
carriers: American, United and TWA. Within a year after
the Deregulation Act became effective, seven nonstop car-
riers were competing in the New York-Los Angeles mar-
ket while six were competing on the New York-San
Francisco route. Intense price cutting ensued, making
those two markets much less rewarding for everyone.
Listing those cities whose air service has increased by at
least forty daily departures since 1978 provides another
example. The list contains just twenty-two cities or mar-
kets. At the top is New York/Newark. Others are such
major metropolitan centers as Houston, Dallas/Fort
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Worth, Denver, Phoenix, Minneapolis/St. Paul, Atlanta
and Los Angeles. There are only a few modestly sized cit-
ies on the list. Significantly, none are in the category of
medium or small markets.3
Although destructive competition has raged in the larg-
est cities, more cities have lost service or experienced ser-
vice reductions than have gained service or seen existing
service increased. On the basis of total weekly scheduled
departures, for example, 364 markets had declined or re-
main unchanged between 1978 and March of 1983, while
only 289 markets had increased. Similarly, 436 markets
had lost total weekly seats since 1978, while only 217 mar-
kets had gained. In other words, between March of 1979
and March of 1983, 116 cities have lost all air service
while only 40 cities have service today that never had it
before. Losers have outnumbered gainers by almost
three to one!
Moreover, many of those cities adversely affected are
important commercial and population centers. The list
includes cities such as Chattanooga, Tennessee; Charles-
ton, West Virginia; Columbia, South Carolina; Jackson,
Mississippi; and Monroe, Louisiana. The inescapable
conclusion is that a few large markets have prospered
from deregulation while many smaller markets have
suffered.
The effects on air fares are equally confusing. One of
the glaring flaws of the pricing structure in the new envi-
ronment has been its lack of fairness and equity for con-
sumers, a deficiency that has damaged the credibility of
the entire industry. The examples are already notorious.
InJanuary of 1982, a passenger could fly 2,500 miles from
New York to San Francisco for $99, but would pay $268
to fly 1,800 miles from Memphis to San Francisco.4 This
disparity made no sense economically and seemed grossly
unfair to the consumer, but it was a reflection of the com-
3 CAB STAFF STUDY, REPORT ON AIRLINE SERVICE, FARES, TRAFFIC, LOAD FAC-
TORS AND MARKET SHARES (Issue No. 26, June 1983).
4 OFFICIAL AIRLINE GUIDE, NORTH AMERICAN EDITION Uan. 15, 1982).
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petitive realities that existed at the time. Unforunately,
competition still produces the same results in certain mar-
kets. Deregulation implied lower fares for most, but has
delivered them only to the chosen few. Most passengers
are now paying higher fares or at least more than they
might be paying if fares were still regulated.
Meanwhile, the fare system has had a disastrous effect
on the industry. The explosion of new fares under dereg-
ulation created nothing short of chaos for airline person-
nel and travel agents. And outrageous discounting, often
below costs, almost brought the industry to its knees fi-
nancially in 1981 and 1982. The mileage-based pricing
system introduced by American early in 1983 has im-
proved the situation by eliminating some of the worst fare
inequities. In many markets, fares are now being offered
on a more sensible and economically realistic basis. The
problem has not been solved, however. The competitive
dynamics of this industry are such that the potential for
renewed chaos and complexity always exists, as the events
of 1984 are proving. Hopefully, though, the members of
the industry have learned from the bitter financial lessons
of the past few years.
Other anomalies abound. The industry, for example, is
offering less nonstop and effective single-plane service
than under the old system, because of the extensive de-
velopment of hubs and their emphasis on connecting
services. In the days of regulation when route franchises
Were clearly defined, airlines could afford to operate on a
nonstop or single-plane basis between many pairs of cit-
ies. Accordingly, the public became accustomed to this
level of convenience and came to associate it with good
airline service. Business travelers, for whom schedule fre-
quency and convenience are paramount, in particular
grew dependent on this level of service.
Under the extreme competitive and economic pressures
of deregulation, however, airlines have had to find new
and more efficient ways of scheduling their flights. The
result has been less nonstop, or point-to-point, flying and
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a dramatic shift to the hub-and-spoke system (where
flights from one part of the system feed into an intermedi-
ate point and exchange passengers and freight with flights
going to other parts of the system). This massive realign-
ment of schedules and routes into huge hub-and-spoke
operations has developed into one of the most significant
themes of the deregulation era and is being practiced by
dozens of airlines, large and small, in all parts of the coun-
try. Indeed, the practice is so widespread today that even
the hubs themselves compete with one another for pas-
sengers and freight.
The emergence of hubs has fostered a dramatic change
in air travel patterns. Today there are fewer opportunities
to fly nonstop to a final destination because there are
fewer nonstop flights available. Most passengers also find
themselves traveling the entire distance with the same air-
line, rather than making interline connections to another
airline at the intermediate point, because most airlines
built their hubs with the aim of keeping passengers within
their respective systems.
The numbers once again tell the story. Over the past
six years, the percentage of passengers using on-line ser-
vice (that is, those remaining within a single airline's sys-
tem) has jumped from 84 percent to 92 percent. At the
same time, however, the percentage of passengers using
single-plane service to their final destination has dropped
significantly in all but a token number of markets. In the
Louisville-Los Angeles market, for example, 62.2 percent
of all passengers used single-plane service in 1978 but
only 3.7 percent did so in 1982. 5 Boston-Nashville is an-
other example. On that route, 78.7 percent were single-
plane passengers in 1978 but only 36.4 percent flew sin-
gle-plane in 1982.a The point is futher illustrated by a
recent study which showed that 24 percent of American
Airlines' on-line passengers required connecting flights in
- CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD, ORIGIN - DESTINATION SURVEY OF AIRLINE PASSEN-
GER TRAFFIC DOMESTIC, Table 12, Fourth Quarters of 1978 and 1982.
6Id.
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1982, as compared with 8 percent in 1978. 7 Thus, a sys-
tem that was to produce better service has instead led the
industry to offer fewer nonstop and direct flights and
more flights requiring connections.
Yet another anomaly exists in that one-stop or connect-
ing flights are often cheaper than nonstop flights in many
large markets like New York-Los Angeles. The desire of
airlines to promote their hubs by luring passengers away
from airlines with nonstop services in particular markets
accounts for this pricing contradiction. A few years ago,
for example, a competitor of American established a ma-
jor hub in Denver and began offering coast-to-coast fares
over the Denver hub that seriously undercut the already
low fares in effect for transcontinental nonstop flights. To
protect its market position, American was forced to match
the hub fares over its connecting center at Dallas/Fort
Worth, even though the fares were clearly unwise and un-
related to the production costs of connecting service. In
effect, the attractive one stop flight required the passen-
gers to be handled one additional time on the ground and
to be flown on 727 aircraft that are not as efficient per seat
mile as the wide-body aircraft used in the nonstop trans-
continental markets. It simply does not make sense to of-
fer lower prices for a product that costs more to produce.
Neither does it make sense to use fares to discourage non-
stop travel while promoting service that involves greater
circuity and elapsed travel time. And it does not make
sense to divert traffic to less efficient and less productive
aircraft. Logic and reason, however, are often overshad-
owed in the new age by the demands of competition.
One of the major complaints about the old regulatory
system was that passengers in short-haul markets were
subsidized through generally higher fares paid by passen-
gers on long-haul routes. One of the curious ironies of
deregulation is that subsidization still occurs. Today, the
cost of traveling between the New York area and Los An-
2931985]
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geles can be as low as $119 each way. But to fly from
Memphis to Phoenix (just half the distance) will cost
$341.11 The higher fare paid by the Memphis passenger
helps to underwrite the big transcontinental discount.
Scores of other hidden examples can be found through-
out the system.
Another anomaly of the new age is that while some cit-
ies are losing service or are seeing a decline in the fre-
quency of their service, schedules are being built around
hub airports. These schedules are entirely out of propor-
tion to the local passenger demand in hub cities. The Los
Angeles market illustrates this point. For years, American
operated nonstop service between Nashville and Los An-
geles. With the emphasis on hubs in the new environ-
ment, however, it became prudent to discontinue the
Nashville nonstops and instead route those airplanes
through the DFW hub. In order to build the DFW hub,
American increased its nonstop frequency between DFW
and Los Angeles and even added widebody airplanes on
the route. The end result, of course, is that Dallas/Ft.
Worth residents flying to Los Angeles have six daily non-
stop flights to choose from, but Nashville residents, who
once could fly nonstop to Los Angeles, now have to
change planes at DFW. The proponents of deregulation
did not allude to this consequence when selling the con-
cept of deregulation to Congress and the public.
The proponents of deregulation also failed to indicate
that new airlines entering the industry in the new environ-
ment would receive the kind of preferential treatment that
has been accorded such newcomers. The federal govern-
ment, for example, has given many new airlines loan guar-
antees, and thus lower costs, to facilitate aircraft
acquisitions. From its founding until 1983, about two
years ago, People Express enjoyed CAB exemptions from
the baggage liability and denied boarding compensation
rules that apply to the rest of the industry. The CAB
8 OFFICIAL AIRLINE GUIDE, NORTH AMERICAN EDITION (Oct. 15, 1984).
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granted the exemption on the theory that People's Ex-
press was a new, low-fare airline and therefore should not
be expected to bear the same expense burdens as estab-
lished carriers. People's Express stated that the adminis-
trative burden - for an airline with less than 50 aircraft -
would be in excess $3 million annually. Imagine the cost
to a huge, established airline! Strangely, of course, there
was no similar CAB edict to prevent People's Express
from using its low fares to steal traffic from the rest of the
industry. The inconsistency in the government's logic is
astounding.
Looking back over the last five years, it is evident that
deregulation certainly has not lived up to its euphoric bill-
ing. Additionally, the new air transport system which has
emerged under deregulation has done very little for the
industry's major constituents. The public has not benefit-
ted. There is less nonstop service, most lengthy trips re-
quire stops at intermediate hubs, and fares are widely
inconsistent and tend to favor the few chosen markets.
Stockholders have not benefitted. Most carriers have strug-
gled financially in the new age, eroding stockholder equity
and preventing the kind of solid, sustained profitability
that leads to renewed or increased dividends. Airline em-
ployees have not benefitted. Layoffs, wage cuts, benefit re-
ductions and other austerity measures have almost
become the norm in the industry as airlines fight for sur-
vival in an intensely competitive environment. Most cities
have not benefitted. More cities have lost service than
have gained service. Airline schedules have become con-
centrated around hub airports in a few major cities at the
expense of many small markets. Aircraft manufacturers have
not benefitted. As losses have mounted over the past few
years, airlines have been forced to cancel orders, delay
aircraft deliveries, and discontinue plans for new orders
that, absent deregulation, would have been placed. As a
result, the manufacturers themselves are struggling and
are finding it hard to compete in world markets where
some competitors are backed by foreign governments that
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assist their manufacturers in luring new orders with vari-
ous financing incentives. Lenders and creditors have not
benefitted. Some airlines - Braniff, Continental, Air New
England, Altair, Air Florida, Golden West - have gone
bankrupt. Other carriers with serious financial troubles
have had to seek debt restructuring and other concessions
that impede the recovery of massive investments in the
industry. Airlines now have a "bad name" in the financial
community. Lenders already heavily committed to poor-
risk carriers now have little money for the good-risk air-
lines who need capital for growth and revitalization.
Should these harsh facts suggest that the industry re-
turn to some form of regulation? I would respond an em-
phatic "no." The industry is too complex, too dynamic
and too far down the road of deregulation ever to be re-
regulated in any equitable,. sensible way. The deregu-
lators intended to totally dismantle the economic struc-
ture of regulation. The deregulators sought to throw the
industry completely open so that free market forces alone
would determine the prices charged, the markets served,
and the manner of doing business. Though the results are
open to question, the attempt itself was a complete suc-
cess, as far as it went.
On every economic front, the industry has been revolu-
tionized. All of the old boundaries and restrictions have
vanished. The airlines move today through a new and
largely uncharted terrain. The boundaries of a former
age, however sensible and beneficial they may look in
restrospect, can no longer be erected in any logical way.
Any attempt by legislators to undo deregulation and put
the old system back together would simply make condi-
tions in the industry worse. Again, this is an extremely
complex industry. There was little congressional under-
standing of these complexities during the deregulation
debates of the 1970's, and there is no reason to believe
that Congress, as a whole, is any more knowledgeable to-
day. The airlines could just as easily again become the
victims of misguided notions and simplistic judgments.
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Many in the airline industry have paid a heavy price for
change. When deregulation was enacted, the industry
found itself with the wrong airplanes, with a cost structure
that was too high, with too many point-to-point routes,
with too many employees, and with airport facilties that
were too large in some markets and too small in others.
Adaptation has not been easily achieved, but American is
finally adjusting to the new environment. American's
hubs are in place, it is whittling away at its cost structure;
employment levels are more realistic, it is acquiring new,
more efficient aircraft, and it is bringing airport facilities
in line with the needs of a realigned route network.
To complete the task and prosper once again, a higher
degree of labor/management cooperation than has been
historically practiced in the industry is essential. Under
deregulation no high-cost airline can hope for long-term
profitability. American's labor and management are
working hard to effect the transition from high to low cost
without sacrificing the income or the jobs and security of
career employees.
Now, just as American's reputation, service skills, mar-
keting and operational abilities, and revamped route
structure are beginning to come together, some suggest
that perhaps the industry should reverse itself in mid-
stream and undo everything that has been accomplished
since 1978. Such a suggestion is not only naive, it is un-
realistic. The wiser, sounder course is to complete the ad-
justment to deregulation that is already well underway.
At this advanced stage in the game, it is clearly preferable
that the marketplace, rather than the government, deter-
mine American's future and the future of the industry.
While the government continues to hold an important po-
sition in matters pertaining to safety, other issues are best
left to free enterprise and open competition, just as the
proponents of deregulation intended.
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